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Abstract—The risk of cascading blackouts greatly relies on
failure probabilities of individual components in power grids. To
quantify how component failure probabilities (CFP) influences
blackout risk (BR), this paper proposes a sample-induced semi-
analytic approach to characterize the relationship between CFP
and BR. To this end, we first give a generic component failure
probability function (CoFPF) to describe CFP with varying
parameters or forms. Then the exact relationship between BR
and CoFPFs is built on the abstract Markov-sequence model
of cascading outages. Leveraging a set of samples generated by
blackout simulations, we further establish a sample-induced semi-
analytic mapping between the unbiased estimation of BR and
CoFPFs. Finally, we derive an efficient algorithm that can directly
calculate the unbiased estimation of BR when the CoFPFs change.
Since no additional simulations are required, the algorithm is
computationally scalable and efficient. Numerical experiments
well confirm the theory and the algorithm.
Index Terms—Cascading outage; component failure probabil-
ity; blackout risk.
I. INTRODUCTION
DURING the process of a cascading outage in powersystems, the propagation of component failures may
cause serious consequences, even catastrophic blackouts [1],
[2]. For the sake of effectively mitigating blackout risk, a
naive way is to reduce the probability of blackouts, or more
precisely, to reduce failure probabilities of system components
by means of maintenance or so. Intuitively, it can be readily
understood that component failure probabilities (CFPs) have
great influence on blackout risk (BR). However, it is not clear
how to efficiently quantify such influence, particularly in large-
scale power grids.
Generally, CFP largely depends on characteristics of system
components as well as working conditions of those com-
ponents. Since working conditions, e.g., system states, may
change during a cascading outage, CFP varies accordingly.
Therefore, to quantitatively characterize the influence of CFP
on BR, two essential issues need to be addressed. On the one
hand, an appropriate probability function of component failure
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which can consider changing working conditions should be
well defined first to depict CFP . In this paper, such a func-
tion is referred to as component failure probability function
(CoFPF). On the other hand, the quantitative relationship
between CoFPF and BR should also be explicitly established.
For the first issue, a few CoFPFs have been built in terms
of specific scenarios. [3] proposes an end-of-life CoFPF of
power transformers taking into account the effect of load
conditions. [4] considers the process and mechanism of tree-
contact failures of transmission lines, based on which an ana-
lytic formulation is proposed. Another CoFPF of transmission
lines given in [5] adopts an exponential function to depict the
relationship between CFP and some specific indices which can
be calculated from monitoring data of transmission lines. This
formulation can be extended to other system components in
addition to transmission lines, e.g., transformers [6]. Similar
works can be found in [7], [8]. In addition, some simpler
CoFPFs are deployed in cascading outage simulations [9]–
[12]. Specifically, in the OPA model [9], CoFPF is usually
chosen as a monotonic function of the load ratio, while a
piecewise linear function is deployed in the hidden failure
model [10]. Such simplified formulations have been widely
used in various blackout models [11], [12]. However, it is
worthy of noting that these CoFPFs are formulated for specific
scenarios. In this paper, we adopt a generic CoFPF to facilitate
establishing the relationship between CFP and BR.
The second issue, i.e., the quantitative relationship between
CoFPF and BR, is the main focus of this paper. Generally,
since various kinds of uncertainties during the cascading pro-
cess make the number of possible propagation paths explode
with the increase of system scale, it is extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to calculate the exact value of BR in practice.
Therefore, analyticaly expressing the relationship between
CoFPF and BR is really challenging. In this context, estimated
BR by statistics, which is based on a set of samples generated
by cascading simulations, appears to be the only practical
substitute.
Among the sample-based approaches in BR estimation,
Monte Carlo simulation (MCS) is the most popular one
to date. However, MCS usually requires a large number
of samples with respect to specific CoFPFs for achieving
satisfactory accuracy of estimation. Due to the intrinsic in-
efficiency, MCS is greatly limited in practice, particularly
in large-scale systems [13]. More importantly, it cannot ex-
plicitly reveal the relationship between CoFPF and BR in
an analytic manner. Hence, whenever parameters or forms
of CoFPFs change, MCS must be completely re-conducted
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to generate new samples for correctly estimating BR, which
is extremely time consuming. Moreover, due to the inherent
strong nonlinearity between CoFPF and BR, when multiple
CoFPFs change simultaneously, which is a common scenario
in practice, BR cannot be directly estimated by using the
relationship between BR and individual CoFPFs. In this case,
in order to correctly estimate BR and analyze the relationship,
the required sample size will dramatically increase compared
with the case that a single CoFPF changes. That indicates even
efficient variance reduction techniques (which may effectively
reduce the sample size in a single scenario [14], [15]) are
employed, the computational complexity will remain too high
to be tractable.
The aforementioned issue gives rise to an interesting ques-
tion: when one or multiple CoFPFs change, could it be
possible to accurately estimate BR without re-conducting the
extremely time-consuming blackout simulations? To answer
this question, the paper proposes a sample-induced semi-
analytic method to quantitatively characterize the relationship
between CoFPFs and BR based on a given sample set. Main
contributions of this work are threefold:
1) Based on a generic form of CoFPFs, a cascading outage
is formulated as a Markov sequence with appropriate
transition probabilities. Then an exact relationship be-
tween BR and CoFPFs results.
2) Given a set of blackout simulation samples, an unbiased
estimation of BR is derived, rendering a semi-analytic
expression of the mapping between BR and CoFPFs.
3) A high-efficiency algorithm is devised to directly com-
pute BR when CoFPFs change, avoiding re-conducting
any blackout simulations.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, a
generic formulation of CoFPF, an abstract model of cascading
outages as well as the exact relationship between CoFPF and
BR are presented. Then the sample-induced mapping between
the unbiased estimation of BR and CoFPFs is explicitly estab-
lished in Section III. A high-efficiency algorithm is presented
in Section IV. In Section V, case studies are given. Finally,
Section VI concludes the paper with remarks.
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COFPFS AND BR
The propagation of a cascading outage is a complicated
dynamic process, during which many practical factors are
involved, such as hidden failures of components, actions of
the dispatch/control center, etc. In this paper, we focus on the
influence of random component failures (or more precisely,
CFP) on the BR, where a cascading outage can be simplified
into a sequence of component failures with corresponding
system states, and usually emulated by steady-state models
[9], [10], [12]. In this case, individual component failures are
only related to the current system state while independent of
previous states, which is known as the Markov property. This
property enables an abstract model of cascading outages with
a generic form of CoFPFs, as we explain below.
A. A Generic Formulation of CoFPFs
To describe a CFP varying along with the propagation of
cascading outages, a CoFPF is usually defined in terms of
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Fig. 1. Cascading process in power systems
working conditions of the component. In the literature, CoFPF
has various forms with regard to specific scenarios [3]–[12].
To generally depict the relationship between BR and CFP with
varying parameters or forms, we first define an abstract CoFPF
here. Specifically, the CoFPF of component k, denoted by ϕk,
is defined as
ϕk(sk,ηk) := Pr(component k fails at sk given ηk) (1)
In (1), sk represents the current working condition of com-
ponent k, which can be load ratio, voltage magnitude, etc.
ηk is the parameter vector. Both ηk and the form of ϕk
represent the characteristics of the component k, e.g., the type
and age of component k . It is worthy of noting that the
working condition of component k varies during a cascading
outage, resulting in changes of the related CFPs. On the other
hand, whereas the cascading process usually does not change
ηk and the form of ϕk, they can also be influenced due to
controlled or uncontrolled factors, such as maintenance and
extreme weather, etc. In this sense, Eq. (1) provides a generic
formulation to depict such properties of CoFPFs.
B. Formulation of Cascading Outages
In this paper, we are only interested in the paths of cascading
outages that lead to blackouts as well as the associated load
shedding. Then, according to [14], cascading outages can be
abstracted as a Markov sequence with appropriate transition
probabilities. Specifically, denote j ∈ N as the sequence label
and Xj as the system state at stage j of a cascading outage.
Here, Xj can represent the power flow of transmission lines,
the ON/OFF statuses of components, or other system status of
interest. The complete state space, denoted by X , is spanned
by all possible system states. X0 is the initial state of the
system, which is assumed to be deterministic in our study.
Under this condition, X is finite when only the randomness of
component failures is considered [14]. Note that Xj specifies
the working conditions of each component at the current stage
(stage j) in the system, consequently determines sk in the
CoFPF, ϕk(sk,ηk). Then an n-stage cascading outage can
be represented by a series of states, Xj (see Fig. 1) and
mathematically defined as below.
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Definition 1. An n-stage cascading outage is a Markov
sequence Z := {X0, X1, ..., Xj , ..., Xn, Xj ∈ X , ∀j ∈ N}
with respect to a given joint probability series g(Z) =
g(Xn, · · · , X1, X0).
In the definition above, n is the total number of cascading
stages, or the length of the cascading outage. Particularly, we
denote the set of all possible paths of cascading outages in
the power system by Z . Since X and the total number of
components are finite, Z is finite as well, albeit it may be
huge in practice. Then for a specific path, z ∈ Z , of cascading
outages, we have
z = {x0, x1, ..., xj , ..., xn}
g(Z = z) = g(X0 = x0, ..., Xj = xj , ..., Xn = xn)
where g(Z = z) is the joint probability of the path, z. For
simplicity, we denote g(Z = z) as g(z) = g(xn, · · · , x1, x0).
Invoking the conditional probability formula and Markov
Property, g(z) can be further rewritten as
g(z) = g(xn, · · · , x1, x0)
= gn(xn|xn−1 · · · x0) · gn−1(xn−1|xn−2 · · ·x0)
· · · g1(x1|x0) · g0(x0)
= gn(xn|xn−1) · gn−1(xn−1|xn−2) · · · g0(x0)
(2)
where
gj+1(xj+1|xj) = Pr(Xj+1 = xj+1|Xj = xj)
g0(x0) = Pr(X0 = x0) = 1
It is worthy of noting that this formulation is a mathematical
abstraction of the cascading processes in practice and sim-
ulation models considering physical details [9], [10], [12].
Different from the high-level statistic models [18], [19], it
can provide an analytic way to depict the influence of many
physical details, e.g., CFP, on the cascading outages and BR,
which will be elaborately explained later on.
C. Formulation of Blackout Risk
In the literature, blackout risk has various definitions [14],
[20], [21] . Here we adopt the widely-used one, which is
defined with respect to load shedding caused by cascading
outages.
Due to the intrinsic randomness of cascading outages, the
load shedding, denoted by Y , is also a random variable
up to the path-dependent propagation of cascading outages.
Therefore, Y can be regarded as a function of cascading outage
events, denoted by Y := h(Z). Then the BR with respect to
g(Z) is defined as the expectation of the load shedding greater
than a given level, Y0. That is
Rg(Y0) = E(Y · δ{Y≥Y0}) (3)
where, Rg(y0) stands for the BR with respect to g(Z) and Y0;
δ{Y≥Y0} is the indicator function of {Y ≥ Y0}, given by
δ{Y≥Y0} :=
{
1 if Y ≥ Y0;
0 otherwise.
In Eq. (3), when the load shedding level is chosen as Y0 = 0,
it is simply the traditional definition of blackout risk. If
Y0 > 0, it stands for the risk of cascading outages with
quite serious consequences, which is closely related to the
renowned risk measures, value at risk(VaR) and conditional
value at risk(CVaR) [16]. Specifically, the risk defined in (3) is
equivalent to CVaRα times (1−α) with respect to VaRα = Y0
with a confidence level of α.
D. Relationship Between BR and CoFPFs
We first derive the probability of cascading outages based
on the generic form of CoFPFs. Then we characterize the
relationship between BR and CoFPFs.
At stage j, the working condition of component k can be
represented as a function of the system state xj , denoted by
φk(xj). That is sk := φk(xj). Hence the CFP of component
k at stage j is ϕk(φk(xj),ηk). For simplicity, we avoid the
abuse of notion by letting ϕk(xj) to stand for ϕk(φk(xj),ηk).
Considering stages j and (j + 1), we have
gj+1(xj+1|xj) =
∏
k∈F (xj)
ϕk(xj) ·
∏
k∈F¯ (xj)
(1− ϕk(xj)) (4)
In Eq. (4), F (xj) is the component set consisting of the
components that are defective at xj+1 but work normally at
xj , while F¯ (xj) consists of components that work normally
at xj+1. With (4), Eq. (2) can be rewritten as
g(z) =
n−1∏
j=0
gj+1(xj+1|xj)
=
n−1∏
j=0
[ ∏
k∈F (xj)
ϕk(xj) ·
∏
k∈F¯ (xj)
(1− ϕk(xj))
]
(5)
Furthermore, substituting Y = h(Z) into (3) yields
Rg(y0) = E(h(Z) · δ{h(Z)≥Y0})
=
∑
z∈Z
g(z)h(z)δ{h(z)≥Y0}
(6)
Theoretically, the relationship between BR and CoFPFs can
be established immediately by substituting (5) into (6). How-
ever, this relationship cannot be directly applied in practice, as
we explain. Note that, according to (5), the component failures
occurring at different stages on a path of cascading outages are
correlated with one another. As a consequence, this long-range
coupling, unfortunately, produces complicated and nonlinear
correlation between BR and CoFPFs. In addition, since the
number of components in a power system usually is quite
large, the cardinality of Z can be huge. Hence it is practically
impossible to accurately calculate BR with respect to the given
CoFPFs by directly using (5) and (6). To circumvent this
problem, next we turn to using an unbiased estimation of
BR as a surrogate, and propose a sample-based semi-analytic
method to characterize the relationship.
III. SAMPLE-INDUCED SEMI-ANALYTIC
CHARACTERIZATION
A. Unbiased Estimation of BR
To estimate BR, conducting MCS is the easiest and the most
extensively-used way. The first step is to generate independent
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identically distributed (i.i.d.) samples of cascading outages and
corresponding load shedding with respect to the joint proba-
bility series, g(Z). Unfortunately, g(Z) is indeed unknown in
practice. In such a situation, one can heuristically sample the
failed components at each stage of possible cascading outage
paths in terms of the corresponding system states and CoFPFs.
Afterwards, system states at the next stage are determined
with the updated system topology. This process repeats until
there is no new failure happening anymore. Then a path-
dependent sample is generated. This method essentially carries
out sampling sequentially using the conditional component
probabilities instead of the joint probabilities. Eq. (5) provides
this method with a mathematical interpretation, which is a
application of the Markov property of cascading outages.
Suppose N i.i.d. samples of cascading outage paths are
obtained with respect to g(Z). Let Zg := {z
i, i = 1, · · · , N}
record the set of these samples. Then, the i-th cascading outage
path contained in the set is expressed by zi := {xi0, · · · , x
i
ni},
where ni is the number of total stages of the i-th sample.
For each zi ∈ Zg, the associated load shedding is given by
yi = h(zi). All yi make up the set of load shedding with
respect to g(Z), denoted by Yg := {y
i, i = 1, · · · , N}. Then
the unbiased estimation of BR is formulated as
Rˆg(Y0) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
yiδ{yi≥Y0} =
1
N
N∑
i=1
h(zi)δ{h(zi)≥Y0} (7)
Note that Eq. (7) applies to g(Z) or the corresponding
CoFPFs. That implies the underlying relationship between BR
and CoFPFs relies on samples. Hence, whenever parameters
or forms of the CoFPFs change, all samples need to be
re-generated to estimate the BR, which is extremely time
consuming, even practically impossible. Next we derive a
semi-analytic method by building a mapping between CoFPFs
and the unbiased estimation of BR.
B. Sample-induced Semi-Analytic Characterization
Suppose the samples are generated with respect to g(Z).
Then the sample set is Zg , and the set of load shedding is
Yg . When changing g(Z) into f(Z) (both are defined on
Z), usually all samples of cascading outage paths need to
be regenerated. However, inspired by the sample treatment
in Importance Sampling [14], it is possible to avoid sample
regeneration by revealing the underlying relationship between
g(Z) and f(Z). Specifically, for a given path zi, we define
w(zi) :=
f(zi)
g(zi)
, (zi ∈ Z) (8)
then each sample in terms of f(z) can be represented as the
sample of g(z) weighted by w(z). Consequently, the unbiased
estimation of BR in terms of f(Z) can be directly obtained
from the sample generated with respect to g(Z), as we explain.
From Eqs. (7) and (8), we have
Rˆf (Y0) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
w(zi)h(zi)δ{h(zi)≥Y0} (9)
Obviously, when w(z) ≡ 1, z ∈ Z , (9) is equivalent to (7).
Moreover, Eq. (9) is an unbiased estimation by noting that
E(Rˆf (Y0)) = E
(
f(Z)
g(Z)h(Z)δ{h(Z)≥Y0}
)
=
∑
z∈Z
g(z)× f(z)g(z)h(z)δ{h(z)≥Y0}
= Rf (Y0)
(10)
Note that in Eqs. (9) and (10), only the information of h(z)
is required. One crucial implication is that the BR with
respect to f(Z), Rf , can be estimated directly with no need
of regenerating cascading outage samples. This feature can
further lead to an efficient algorithm to analyze BR under
varying CoFPFs, which will be discussed next.
IV. ESTIMATING BR WITH VARYING COFPFS
A. Changing a Single CoFPF
We first consider a simple case, where a single CoFPF
changes. Suppose CoFPF of the m-th component changes
from ϕm to ϕ¯m
1, and the corresponding joint probability
series changes from g(Z) to f(Z). Considering a sample of
cascading outage path generated with respect to g(Z), i.e.,
zi ∈ Zg, we have
f(zi) =
ni−1∏
j=0
fj+1(x
i
j+1|x
i
j)
=
ni−1∏
j=0

 ∏
k∈Fm(xi
j
)
ϕk(x
i
j) ·
∏
k∈F¯m(xi
j
)
(1− ϕk(x
i
j))

·
· · ·Γ(ϕ¯m, z
i)
(11)
where,
Γ(ϕ¯m, z
i) =


nim−1∏
j=0
(1− ϕ¯m(x
i
j)) : if n
i
m = n
i
ϕ¯m(x
i
nim
)
nim−1∏
j=0
(1− ϕ¯m(x
i
j)) : otherwise
(12)
Here, nim is the stage at which them-th component experience
an outage. Particularly, nim = n
i when the m-th component is
still working normally at the last stage of the cascading outage
path. Component set Fm(xij) := F (x
i
j) \ {m} consists of all
the elements in F (xij) except for m. Similarly F¯
m(xij) :=
F¯ (xij) \ {m} is the component set including all the elements
in F¯ (xij) except for m . According to (8), the sample weight
is
w(zi) =
f(zi)
g(zi)
=
Γ(ϕ¯m, z
i)
Γ(ϕm, zi)
(13)
Substituting (13) into (9), the unbiased estimation of BR is
Rˆf (Y0) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Γ(ϕ¯m, z
i)
Γ(ϕm, zi)
h(zi)δ{h(zi)≥Y0} (14)
Eq. (14) provides an unbiased estimation of BR after
changing a CoFPF by only using the original samples.
1For simplicity, we use the notion ϕ¯m to denote the new CoFPF of
component m, which may have a new function form or parameters ηm.
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B. Changing Multiple CoFPFs
In this section, we consider the general case that multiple
CoFPFs change simultaneously. Invoking the expression of
f(zi) in (11), we have
g(zi) =
∏
k∈K
Γ(ϕk, z
i) (15)
f(zi) =
∏
k∈Kc
Γ(ϕ¯k, z
i) ·
∏
k∈Ku
Γ(ϕk, z
i) (16)
where, K is the complete set of all components in the system;
Kc is the set of components whose CoFPFs change; Ku is the
set of others, i.e., K = Kc∪Ku; ϕ¯k is the new CoFPF of the
k-th component.
According to (15) and (16), the sample weight is given by
w(zi) =
∏
k∈Kc
Γ(ϕ¯k, z
i)
Γ(ϕk, zi)
(17)
Substituting (17) into (9) yields
Rˆf (Y0) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
( ∏
k∈Kc
Γ(ϕ¯k, z
i)
Γ(ϕk, zi)
h(zi)δ{h(zi)≥Y0}
)
(18)
Eq. (18) is a generalization of Eq. (14). (18) provides a
mapping between the unbiased estimation of BR and CoFPFs.
When multiple CoFPFs change, the unbiased estimation of BR
can be directly calculated by using (18). Since no additional
cascading outage simulations are required, and only algebraic
calculations are involved, it is computationally efficient.
C. Algorithm
To clearly illustrate the algorithm, we first rewrite (18) in a
matrix form as
Rˆf (Y0) =
1
N
LFp (19)
In (19), L is an N -dimensional row vector, where Li =
h(zi)δ{h(zi)≥Y0}/g(z
i). Fp is an N -dimensional column vec-
tor, where Fpi = f(z
i).
We further define two N × ka matrices A and B, where
ka is the total number of all components, Aik = Γ(ϕk, z
i),
Bik = Γ(ϕ¯k, z
i). According to (16), we have
Fpi =
∏
k∈Kc
Bik ·
∏
k∈Ku
Aik (20)
Then the algorithm is given as follows.
• Step 1: Generating samples. Based on the system and blackout
model in consideration, generate a set of i.i.d. samples. Record
the sample sets Zg and Yg , as well as the row vector L.
• Step 2: Calculating Fp. Define the new CoFPFs for each
component in Kc, and calculate B and A. Then calculate Fp
according to (20). Particularly, instead of calculation, A can be
saved in Step 1.
• Step 3: Data analysis. According to (19), estimate the blackout
risk for the changed CoFPFs.
D. Implications
The proposed method has important implications in
blackout-related analyses. Two of typical examples are: effi-
cient estimation of blackout risk considering extreme weather
conditions and the risk-based maintenance scheduling.
For the first case, as well known, extreme weather condi-
tions (e.g., typhoon) often occur for a short time but affect
a wide range of components. The failure probabilities of
related components may increase remarkably. In this case,
the proposed method can be applied to fast evaluate the
consequent risk in terms of the weather forecast.
For the second case, since maintenance can considerably
reduce CoFPFs, the proposed method allows an efficient
identification of the most effective candidate devices in the
system for mitigating blackout risks. Specifically, suppose that
one only considers simultaneous maintenance of at most dm
components. Then the number of possible scenarios is up
to
∑dm
d=1 C(ka, d), which turns to be intractable in a large
practical system (C(ka, d) is the number of d-combinations
from ka elements). Moreover, in each scenario, a great number
of cascading outage simulations are required to estimate the
blackout risk, which is extremely time consuming, or even
practically impossible. In contrast, with the proposed method,
one only needs to generate the sample set in the base scenario.
Then the blackout risks for other scenarios can be directly
calculated using only algebraic calculations, which is very
simple and computationally efficient.
V. CASE STUDIES
A. Settings
In this section, the numerical experiments are carried out
on the IEEE 300-bus system with a simplified OPA model
omitting the slow dynamic [9], [17]. Its basic sampling steps
are summarized as follows.
• Step 1: Data initialization. Initialize the system data and
parameters. Particularly, define specific CoFPFs for each com-
ponent. The initial state is x0.
• Step 2: Sampling outages. At stage j of the i-th sampling,
according to the system state, xij , and CoFPFs, simulate the
component failures with respect to the failure probabilities.
• Step 3: Termination judgment. If new failures happen in Step
2, recalculate the system state xij+1 at stage j+1 with the new
topology, and go back to Step 2; otherwise, one sampling ends.
The corresponding samples are zi = {x0, x
i
1 · · ·x
i
j} and y
i. If
all N simulations are completed, the sampling process ends.
In this simulation model, the state variables Xj are chosen
as the ON/OFF statuses of all components and power flow
on corresponding components at stage j. Meanwhile, the
random failures of transmission lines and power transformers
are considered. The total number of them is ka = 411, and
the CoFPF we use is
ϕk(sk,ηk) =


pkmin : s
k < skd
pk
max
−pk
min
sku−s
k
d
(sk − skd) + p
k
min : else
pkmax : s
k > sku
(21)
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where sk is the load ratio of component k and ηk =
[pkmin, p
k
max, s
k
d, s
k
u]. Specifically, p
k
min denotes the minimum
failure probability of component k when the load ratio is
less than skd; p
k
max denotes the maximum failure probabil-
ity when the load ratio is larger than sku. Usually it holds
0 < pkmin < p
k
max < 1, which depicts certain probability
of hidden failures in protection devices. Particularly, we use
the following initial parameters to generate Zg: s
k
d = 0.97,
sku = 1.3, p
k
max = 0.9995, p
k
min ∼ U [0.002, 0.006], k ∈ K .
It is worthy of noting that the simulation process with
specific settings mentioned above is a simple way to emulate
the propagation of cascading outages. We only use it to
demonstrate the proposed method. The proposed method can
apply when other more realistic models and parameters are
adopted.
B. Unbiasedness of the Estimation of Blackout Risk
In this case, we will show that our method can achieve un-
biased estimation of blackout risk. We first carry out 100,000
cascading outage simulations with the initial parameters. Then
the sample set Zg and related L are obtained. Afterward we
randomly choose a set of failure components, Kc, including
two components. Accordingly, we modify the parameters, ηk,
of their CoFPFs to p¯kmin = p
k
min− 0.001, k ∈ Kc. In terms of
the new settings and various load shedding levels, we estimate
the blackout risks by using (19). For comparison, we re-
generate 100,000 samples under the new settings and estimate
the BRs by using (7). The results are given in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2 shows that the blackout risk estimations with two
methods are almost the same, which indicates the proposed
method can achieve unbiased estimation of BR. Note that our
method requires no more simulations, which is much more
efficient than traditional MCS, and scalable for large-scale
systems.
C. Parameter Changes in CoFPFs
In this case, we test the performance of our method when
parameters, ηk, of some CoFPFs change. The sample set Zg
and related L are based on the 100,000 samples with respect
to the initial parameters. We consider two different settings: 1)
Y0 = 0; 2) Y0 = 1500. Statistically, we obtain Rˆg(0) = 54.2
and Rˆg(1500) = 0.43, respectively.
Since there are 411 components in the system, we consider
ka = 411 different scenarios. Specifically, we change each
CoFPF individually by letting p¯kmin = p
k
min−0.001. Using the
proposed method, the blackout risks can be estimated quickly.
Some results are presented in Table I (Y0 = 0MW) and Table
II (Y0 = 1500MW). Particularly, the average computational
times of unbiased estimation of BR in each scenario in Table
I and II are 0.004s and 0.00001s, respectively.
TABLE I
BR ESTIMATION WHEN PARAMETERS OF COFPFS CHANGE (Y0 = 0)
Component pkmin Blackout Risk reduction
index (×10−3) risk ratio(%)
204 5.8 50.97 6.0
312 5.1 51.93 4.2
372 3.0 53.43 1.5
114 4.1 53.46 1.4
307 3.7 53.53 1.3
410 3.6 53.68 1.0
117 4.0 53.69 1.0
63 2.3 53.70 1.0
259 3.0 53.90 0.6
126 2.7 53.92 0.5
... ... ... ...
Mean value 4.0 54.13 0.2
TABLE II
BR ESTIMATION WHEN PARAMETERS OF COFPF CHANGES (Y0 = 1500)
Component pkmin Blackout Risk reduction
index (×10−3) risk ratio(%)
259 3.0 0.358 16.7
254 4.3 0.380 11.4
204 5.8 0.382 11.0
312 5.1 0.403 6.0
93 3.0 0.403 6.0
325 2.2 0.404 5.9
48 3.0 0.404 5.9
378 2.6 0.405 5.7
116 2.2 0.406 5.5
305 2.2 0.407 5.3
... ... ... ...
Mean value 4.0 0.427 0.5
Table I shows the top ten scenarios having the lowest
value of BR as well as the average risk of all scenarios.
Whereas reducing failure probabilities of certain components
can effectively mitigate the blackout risk, others have little
impact. For example, decreasing pkmin of component #204
results in 6.0% reduction of blackout risk, while the average
ratio of risk reduction is only 0.2%. This result implies
that there may exist some critical components which play
a core role in the propagation of cascading outages and
promoting load shedding. Our method enables a scalable way
to efficiently identify those components, which may facilitate
effective mitigation of blackout risk.
When considering Y0 = 1500MW, which is associated with
serious blackout events, it is interesting to see the most influ-
ential components in Table II are different from that in Table I.
In other words, the impact of CoFPF varies with different load
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shedding levels, which demonstrates the complex relationship
between BR and CoFPFs. To better show this point, we choose
four typical components (#312, #372, #307 and #259) and
calculate the risk reduction ratios with respect to a series of
load shedding levels. As shown in Fig. 3, component #259
has little influence on medium to small size of blackouts,
while considerably reducing the risk of large-size blackouts.
It implies this component has a significant contribution to
the propagation of cascading outages. In contrast, some other
components, such as #307 and #372, result in similar risk
reduction ratios for various load shedding levels. They are
likely to cause certain direct load shedding, but have little
influence on the propagation of cascading outages. In terms
of component #312, the curve of risk reduction ratio exhibits
a multimodal feature, which means the changes of such a
CoFPF may have much larger influence on BR for some load
shedding levels than others. All these results demonstrate a
highly complicated relationship between BR and CoFPFs. Our
method indeed provides a computationally efficient tool to
conveniently analyze such relationships in practice.
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Fig. 3. Ratio of risk reduction under different load shedding levels
TABLE III
RISK REDUCTION RATIO WHEN PARAMETERS OF COFPFS CHANGE (%)
Component Risk reduction ratio Component Risk reduction ratio
index (Y0 = 0) index (Y0 = 1500)
(204,312) 10.2 (204,259) 25.5
(204,372) 7.5 (254,259) 24.5
(114,204) 7.4 (93,259) 22.6
(204,307) 7.3 (259,312) 22.2
(63,204) 7.0 (259,378) 21.8
(204,410) 7.0 (259,305) 21.8
(117,204) 7.0 (259,325) 21.6
(204,259) 6.6 (116,259) 21.3
(126,204) 6.6 (40,259) 21.1
(204,301) 6.5 (48,259) 21.1
... ... ... ...
Mean value 0.3 Mean value 1.0
Then we decrease pkmin of two CoFPFs simultaneously. Zg,
L are the same as before, and the number of scenarios is
C(km, 2) = C(411, 2). The calculated unbiased estimations
with respect to two Y0 are shown in Table III. It is no
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Fig. 4. Estimation of the blackout risk with sampling and calculation
TABLE IV
RISK INCREASE RATIO WHEN FORM OF COFPF CHANGES (%)
Component Risk increase ratio Component Risk increase ratio
index (Y0 = 0) index (Y0 = 1500)
204 12.3 204 22.1
312 5.5 259 21.0
259 0.8 254 16.2
264 0.7 312 7.5
372 0.6 264 6.8
... ... ... ...
Mean value 0.1 Mean value 0.2
surprise that the risk reduction ratios are more remarkable
compared with the results in Table I and Table II, where only
one CoFPF decrease. However, it should be noted that the
pairs of components in Table III are not simple combinations
of the ones shown in Table I/Table II. The reason is that
the relationship between BR and CFP is complicated and
nonlinear, which actually results in the difficulties in analyses
as we demonstrate in Section III.
D. Form Changes in CoFPFs
In this case, we show the performance of the proposed
method when the form of CoFPFs changes. The new form
of CoFPF of component k is modified into
ϕ¯k(sk,ηk) =
{
max(ϕk, ae
bsk) : sk < sku
pkmax : s
k ≥ sku
(22)
where a = pkmin and b =
ln(pk
max
/pk
min
)
sku
are corresponding
parameters. ϕk, pmin, pmax, s
k
u, s
k
d are the same as the
ones in (21). Obviously, the failure probabilities of individual
components are amplified in this case.
Similar to the previous cases, we use the proposed method to
calculate the unbiased estimations of blackout risks when some
CoFPFs change from (21) to (22). The comparison results of
our method and MCS are presented in Fig. 4. In addition, the
blackout risk in several typical scenarios is shown in Tabs IV
and V. These results empirically confirm the efficacy of our
method.
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TABLE V
RISK INCREASE RATIO WHEN FORMS OF COFPFS CHANGE (%)
Component Risk increase ratio Component Risk increase ratio
index (Y0 = 0) index (Y0 = 1500)
(204,312) 17.8 (204,259) 48.7
(204,259) 13.1 (254,259) 43.5
(204,264) 12.9 (204,254) 42.3
(204,372) 12.9 (204,312) 30.7
(204,307) 12.8 (201,204) 30.2
... ... ... ...
Mean value 0.2 Mean value 0.5
TABLE VI
COMPUTING TIME WHEN PARAMETER OR FORM CHANGES IN COFPF
(MIN.)
Calculate B Estimate risk (Y0 = 0) Total
Parameter change 10.0 9.2 19.2
Form change 10.7 9.3 20.0
TABLE VII
COMPUTING TIME WHEN PARAMETER OR FORM CHANGES IN COFPF
(MIN.)
Calculate B Estimate risk (Y0 = 1500) Total
Parameter change 10.0 0.01 10.01
Form change 10.7 0.01 10.71
E. Computational Efficiency
We carry out all tests on a computer with an Intel Xeon
E5-2670 of 2.6GHz and 64GB memory. It takes 107 minutes
to generate Zg (100,000 samples) with respect to the initial
parameters. Then we enumerate all
∑2
d=1 C(ka, d) = 84666
scenarios. In each scenario, the parameters and forms of one
or two CoFPFs are changed (cases in Part C and D, Section V,
respectively). Then we calculate the unbiased estimations of
BR with Y0 = 0 and Y0 = 1500 by using the proposed method
. The complete computational times are given in Tables VI and
VII. It is worthy of noting that the computational times of risk
estimation in tables are the total times for enumerating all the
84666 scenarios. It takes only about 10 minutes to calculateB,
and additional 10 minutes to computing BRs. On the contrary,
it will take about 107× 84666 ≈ 9, 000, 000 minutes for the
MCS method, which is practically intractable.
VI. CONCLUSION WITH REMARKS
In this paper, we propose a sample-induced semi-analytic
method to efficiently quantify the influence of CFP on BR.
Theoretical analyses and numerical experiments show that:
1) With appropriate formulations of cascading outages and
a generic form of CoFPFs, the relationship between
CoFPF and BR is exactly characterized and can be
effectively estimated based on samples.
2) Taking advantages of the semi-analytic expression be-
tween CoFPFs and the unbiased estimation of BR, the
BR can be efficiently estimated when CoFPFs change,
and the relationship between the CFP and BR can be
analyzed correspondingly.
Numerical experiments reveal that the long-range correla-
tion among component failures during cascading outages is
really complicated, which is often considered closely related
to self-organized criticality and power low distribution. Our
results serve as a step towards providing a scalable and
efficient tool for further understanding the failure correlation
and the mechanism of cascading outages. Our ongoing work
includes the application of the proposed method in making
maintenance plans and risk evaluation considering extreme
weather conditions, etc.
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